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Abstract—We are continuously reminded of how change 
induces controversy and resistance, regardless of support. 
We repeatedly experience resistance in difficulties of im-
plementation, little progress, and poor results, rather than 
increased productivity as anticipated. In a detailed account 
of how change plays out, a mosaic of what resistance looks 
like emerges. The picture is both familiar and absolutely 
concrete, and challenges the structural assumptions and 
dichotomies on support and resistance in an organization. 
The findings invite technologies, people, actions, practices 
and materiality to the discussions on support and resistance. 
Index Terms—Change Management, Lean Operations, 
Actor-Network Theory, Resistance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lean literature emphasizes the importance of top man-
agement support [1]–[3], but we are continuously remind-
ed how change, like introducing Lean operations into an 
organization, induces controversy and resistance regard-
less of initial support. We repeatedly experience resistance 
in difficulties of implementation, little progress, and poor 
results rather than increased productivity as anticipated 
[4].  
Literature has introduced concepts like force and fric-
tion [5] to account for resistance. Concepts borrowed from 
physics to illustrate interactions between related objects, 
given both positive and negative influence on change. 
Other approaches include attention and awareness to con-
troversies and alliances, and concepts like the sociology of 
translation [6], [7]. These, and related concepts, do have 
extended impact in academic discourse, but fail to be 
noticed within the field of Lean Operations. They fail, I 
will argue, because the generic and abstract concepts and 
metaphors disconnect theory from people, materiality, 
practices, and processes on the Gemba (the real place), 
and in the workplaces. They fail to prove to be relevant. 
This simple line of arguments challenges our under-
standing of what is going on, and motivates the question: 
What does resistance look like in a change project? 
The renewed focus on events and processes in the 
workplaces is important, because it invites technologies, 
people, actions, practices and materiality to the discussion. 
II. METHOD AND MATERIAL 
The problem statement suggests a more concrete ap-
proach to change; not looking at change as a structural or 
ideological issue, but looking at concrete events and con-
tributions to change in the making.  
The methodological approach in this study draws on the 
perspectives on construction of facts, and assembly of 
technologies and practices found in the works of Bruno 
Latour, John Law, Michel Callon and others - part of what 
is known as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) [8]–[14].  
This descriptive, but analytical, approach is about open-
ing up the black box of change. It requires looking at the 
processes leading up to the changes, as opposed to the end 
product or result alone. It is about contributing to an in-
creased sensitivity towards the practices and processes of 
change. 
The framework introduces actors based not on catego-
ries, but on actions and contributions. Removing the cate-
gories implies removing the presumptions of the special 
nature of someone, or something, and introduces the same 
theoretical framework and concepts for all actors. This 
may be a challenging position, but it is also rewarding, 
because it enables us to treat different elements in the 
project as parts of the same instead of unrelated parts of 
different theoretical frameworks, levels or domains. Treat-
ing all actors within the same framework makes it possible 
to build an awareness and sensitivity based on findings 
excluded from the literature criticized earlier.  
The starting point is the implementation of Lean Opera-
tions in a manufacturing company in Norway. The reader 
who is unfamiliar with Lean could think of it as a method-
ological effort to improve quality in production based on 
removing waste in a broad understanding, and optimizing 
flow of goods and information. Lean operations represent 
a radical change in both design, and practices of produc-
tion in most factories.  
“The Assembly of Lean production” [15] analyzes, in 
depth, the making of the project, practices, and processes, 
but the data and analysis also represent great opportunities 
to explore resistance in a change project in more detail. 
III. RESULTS 
A. Background 
The development project was organized in three phases, 
over a period of almost three years. The first phase target-
ed the mapping of work processes and organizational 
culture, identifying pitfalls and bottlenecks in the value 
stream. The second phase targeted measures and activities 
for the selected pitfalls and bottlenecks, and the third 
phase targeted the implementation and continuous evalua-
tion of measures chosen.  
In the first phase, work was concentrated in the project 
team with regular meetings approximately every fourteen 
days. In the second phase, the work opened up to involve 
a broader group, including operators in the factory, and 
other actors identified in the production process mapping. 
This way the project went through a major metamorpho-
sis. What had been a project of a small number of individ-
uals, choosing to take part, became a project involving 
“everyone”, including outside services, and departments. 
In the third phase, the project went from ideas and plans, 
to radical changes in the way to do production.  
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B. The Quality Management System (QMS) 
The quality system (QMS) got an important role in the 
project. It became the major official source of data on the 
progress of the project, but, early on, it also became a 
symbol of change from the old way of doing production. 
None of these roles were naturally given or passively 
acquired; they proved to be an effect of the contributions 
from many actors over a long time. 
Seen from the workplace, and a user driven perspective, 
the old QMS had an irrelevant and insignificant role in the 
way of doing production, because it was isolated from the 
operators in production. There was no IT hardware availa-
ble on the Gemba. Operators had neither access to the 
system, nor training in the use of the system. It was not 
experienced as a part of the way to do production. In ret-
rospect the picture is somewhat different. Yes, seen from a 
user-driven perspective, it can be argued that the QMS 
was not part of the way to do production, but it can be 
argued, that this is not what the QMS is about. The factory 
had a working, well-established QMS, and procedures for 
using it. It was an electronic system supplemented with 
hard copies, where complaints and divergences were re-
ported on paper, and handed in to the production manager. 
The production manager did a quality check, and regis-
tered the data in the electronic system. This way it was 
very much part of the way to do production, and illustrat-
ed the task and role sharing in the factory. The old QMS 
represented and inscribed hierarchical and hegemonic 
practices that were part of the way to do production in the 
factory. The old QMS was a tool to set major economic 
differences between departments, but not a tool for mak-
ing continuous improvements.  
C. Introducing Lean Operations 
The practical and ideological gap between the old and 
new QMS is illustrated in the ratio of divergences versus 
complaints (about 1:1 in 2007). In a Lean perspective the 
number should be at least 3:1-- the higher ratio the better-- 
indicating an approach to production that identifies and 
stops the defects before they end up as complaints, and 
economic losses.  
The Lean rhetoric of flow and waste, and continuous 
work improvements introduced [16], put the role of the 
QMS on the agenda. It became essential to know details 
and facts behind the waste in order to develop measures to 
address the problems in a systematic way. 
The project team decided October 10, 2007 to “Include 
the QMS in the project. Start the process of redesigning 
the databases to better reflect the actual challenges. Make 
the QMS a central tool in local development of produc-
tion”. But it was not until November 19, 2008 that the 
“The hardware is in place. Training of all employees at the 
department is completed and the use of QMA (QMS) and 
AS400 is in progress. Evaluation and possible follow-up 
of training remains”. 
The redesign included a new scheme that allowed oper-
ators to access the system; new and improved procedures; 
and new layouts to increase the diagnostic features of the 
system. New roles were created to establish a new work-
flow where everything didn’t go to the manager, but in-
stead was directed to operators responsible.  
Now, the main users in the QMS are the ones doing the 
different tasks in production. The operators write and 
update the procedures, file and respond to divergences and 
complaints. The effects are actual changes of practice, and 
not only in the rhetorics which is illustrated in reduced 
numbers of procedures, increasing ratio of divergences 
versus complaints, and sources of defects identified.  
D. Filaments of Resistance 
The time gap illustrates the many obstacles, and the re-
sistance to changes taking place. At the same time, it was 
a project with strong support from top management, pro-
duction managers, and the trade union. The project team 
experienced this blend of resistance and support as a para-
dox, and a source of much frustration.  
The analysis establishes both the old and new QMS as 
pieces of technology that inscribe and support certain 
ways of doing production. This way the analysis implies 
the coexistence of multiple ways of doing production in 
the factory and explains the heterogeneities of resistance, 
and support observed. A resistance not linked to individu-
als, but to practices inscribed in technologies, procedures, 
structures, training, and schemes of doing production. 
The first resistance identified were the factory rules on 
denying operators access to the QMS. The factory rules 
and procedures were clear, in a way, but, at the same time, 
there had been a development project on production effi-
ciency in a different department that had been allowed to 
bypass the procedures and grant the operators access to 
hardware and training in the QMS. That project had im-
proved the efficiency significantly in the department in 
question, and left a door open for us to use. 
The second resistance identified was missing IT hard-
ware on the shop floor. Rules or not, no computers were 
initially available for the operators to use according to the 
Lean Operations plan.  
The third resistance identified was missing training. 
The QMS was a complex system based on Lotus Domino 
databases requiring training and skills to be used effective-
ly. This was not in place.  
The fourth resistance identified was infrastructure. The 
project team was informed by internal IT support that the 
present network infrastructure made it impossible to use 
the system because the bandwidth was inadequate for our 
use. The location of the factory, and the network infra-
structure, further made it impossible to increase the band-
width to the level required. Since we already had a work-
ing connection for the production manager, the bandwidth 
requirements were challenged, and after much back and 
forth, a solution was established based on our local needs, 
and not a general access to all the intranet services. 
IV. DISCUSSIONS 
A. What Did Resistance Look Like? 
This project had espoused practical, and financial sup-
port. At the same time, the obstacles were many, as was 
the resistance exemplified in the QMS, and illustrated in 
the long time it took to establish the new QMS and prac-
tices. In a situation like this, it is easy speculate about 
blame. In retrospect, this was not about blame at all. It was 
about a much stronger, and more serious opponent. It was 
not about trying to convince a person or a group. Findings 
suggest that the stronghold of the resistance was among 
others who preferred the old QMS, and their allies who 
were embedded in those methods of production, and in-
scribed in the associated technology and practices, and 
work organization established.  
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The new QMS produced and interrelated what we could 
think of as emissaries [6, pp. 251–254] that aligned the 
network of procedures, schemes, technological infrastruc-
ture, and trained people.. The emissaries inscribed the new 
way to do production, and made the QMS become an 
apparatus that materialized our understanding of Lean 
Operations, in electronic documents and procedures, act-
ing as agents sent on a mission to represent the project, 
making it possible for the project’s ideas to become both 
mobile and in compliance with our understanding. This 
way, the quality system goes from a neutral artifact, unin-
teresting and forgotten, to a biased actor, taking part in 
how the changes transform the way to do production. 
The analysis and discussions on the assembly of the 
new QMS bring forward the strange relationship between 
resistance and support. Not as an individual “problem” 
(even if that could be a part of the challenge, of course), 
but as an effect of another actor-network present in the 
factory. This way, it is not, anymore, about the dichotomy 
of support or resistance, but both at the same time. We 
will have to anticipate resistance in the presence of strong 
support, as in our case. This acknowledgement links re-
sistance to technologies, practice, and the materiality, and 
address the “strange” example of someone supporting the 
project, while at the same time, being part of a practice 
that resists the project, showed in the analysis of the new 
QMS. 
The heterogeneity of resistance and support illustrates 
how it is no longer about management support, it is about 
the way to do production and the materiality and the peo-
ple part of these practices. We have to anticipate a multi-
plicity of rationalities, discourses or actor-networks shar-
ing the same space in the factory especially in a period of 
changes. 
The heterogeneity of resistance and support also con-
fronts us with someone we know, when we try to answer 
the question about what resistance looks like. Resistance 
looks like our own factory, technologies, software, proce-
dures, training, schemes and people. It is us. To cite Pogo: 
"We have met the enemy and he is us." [17]. 
B. Introducing a Metaphor to Understand Resistance 
It is argued that the resistance was not about individuals 
trying to “sabotage” the project, but about the presence of 
another actor-network, embedded and entangled in the 
materiality of the factory. It was an actor-network in many 
ways like the one we were assembling. The factory was 
therefore, not a tabula rasa, but full of actors already mak-
ing up a network. To make it even more challenging, this 
“other” thinking was inscribed in many of the structures 
and technologies in the factory. It was not about convinc-
ing individuals with rational or emotional arguments, but 
about challenging technologies, practices, and the way we 
do production. It was, therefore, not only about assem-
bling Lean Operations in an empty room, but about as-
sembling something stronger, better, more significant, and 
more relevant than that already present.  
The factory was not an empty place for us to “transfer” 
our new QMS and related practices. The landscape was 
already full of actors assembling a strong network, and 
our biggest error was to treat it as empty, and virgin. It 
was like trying to teach students about force and momen-
tum in physics, without taking into account all the concep-
tions about these, and related, phenomena already in the 
heads of the kids. We met resistance from the already 
established framework and practices, that, from the project 
perspective, seemed like misconceptions. Neither the 
factory, nor the kids are tabula rasa. We better take that 
into account when trying to introduce a competing con-
ceptual framework and practice even if the space seems 
empty.  
The new network was assembled in the presence of, and 
in competition with, the already established practices. The 
metaphor of learning and misconceptions is used to illus-
trate the resistance in the factory, and the presence of an 
alternative actor-network.This was a resistance not based 
on rational individuals to be convinced, but on practices 
inscribed in the way to do production, and therefore, a 
much stronger opponent.  
Resistance becomes a passive, as opposed to an active 
process. The practical implications are seen as part of 
introducing the new way to do production, and in how to 
make it stick. As part of the new way to do production, 
this understanding presents the existence of alternative 
practices, already part of the materiality in the factory. 
That can be in the way the work is organized, the proce-
dures established, the economical scorecard in the compa-
ny and embedded in technologies and software in use. To 
establish something new is not about establishing some-
thing on a tabula rasa. It is the opposite; to establish some-
thing in parallel and competition with something already 
in place. To establish something new is then about recruit-
ing allies from within the people and materiality of the 
factory. This way, it also becomes easier to build on and 
not compete with local knowledge, know-how, machines, 
and experiences in the factory, as they are seen as possible 
allies. The commitment and contribution from the actors is 
the key to establishing the way to do production; the same 
way the project cannot live without the commitment and 
contributions of those who have created it. It means, that if 
the project fails, it is because the individuals, technolo-
gies, and structures in the factory have abandoned it.  
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